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Abstract  
Despite the continued growth of adolescent risk assessment tools, we do not know how these 
tools are being used in adolescent court cases or how this information influences legal decision 
making. To address this gap, we reviewed 50 Canadian, American, and international adolescent 
offender cases using the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth or Youth Level of 
Service/Case Management Inventory.  The results confirm that adolescent risk assessment tools 
are primarily introduced during sentencing or adult transfer proceedings.  Judges identified the 
specific risk and protective factors of youth in 36.2% and 19.0% of cases, respectively.  In terms 
of legal decision making, the risk assessment was either directly or indirectly referred to in 
76.0% of cases; however, judges most often placed some weight on the risk assessment as a part 
of an enumerated list of other important factors.  Although risk assessments were generally 
considered admissible in these cases, some legal concerns were raised, particularly with the use 
of risk assessments to guide sentencing decisions.   
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The Use of the SAVRY and YLS/CMI in Adolescent Court Proceedings: A Case Law Review 
Mental health professionals working within the justice system often conduct risk 
assessments which evaluate the likelihood of an offender to reoffend.  Historically, these 
assessments have occurred in an informal and discretionary manner by individuals with varying 
experience, knowledge, and philosophies (Wiebush, Baird, Krisberg, & Onek, 1995).  However, 
this type of assessment, referred to as unstructured clinical judgement, is subject to significant 
and well-known limitations including high levels of inconsistency and bias, and poor predictive 
accuracy (Borum, 2000; Hoge, 2002).  In fact, past research has shown that clinicians are only 
modestly better than chance when making predictions of violence (Borum, 1996; Mossman, 
1994).  As a result, there has been growing emphasis on the use of standardized assessment tools 
which provide more consistent and valid judgements (Hoge, 2002).   
Standardized risk assessment tools have become increasingly more widespread amongst 
mental health professionals and clinicians (Borum, Lodewijks, Bartel, & Forth, 2010; Otto & 
Heilbrun, 2002).  This is demonstrated by clinical surveys showing that more than 90% of 
forensic clinicians belonging to professional organizations assess risk in their evaluation of 
offenders (Archer, Buffington-Vollum, Stredny, & Handel, 2006; Viljoen, McLachlan, & 
Vincent, 2010).  In addition, some legal cases also appear to demonstrate a preference for 
structured assessment tools.  For example, in Coble v. Texas (2011) the American Psychological 
Association provided an amicus curiae brief to the court which argued that the unstructured 
clinical judgement of Dr. Coons, a forensic psychiatrist, should not be relied upon to determine 
future dangerousness because it can be excessively persuasive to the jury and, unlike structured 
risk assessment, is not based on reliable scientific methods (American Psychological 
Association, 2012).  Although the courts were dismissive of Dr. Coons’ testimony, they upheld 
the decision to admit the testimony and consider it as harmless error because they believed Coble 
was highly dangerous in spite of the testimony provided by Dr. Coons.  Nevertheless, this brief is 
important because it reflects growing consensus that unstructured clinical judgement is inferior 
to more systematized methods of assessing risk.  Furthermore, consistent with social scientists, 
some legal scholars have also asserted that the development and use of reliable risk assessment 
methods is a pressing issue in legal settings (Luther & Mansfield, 2006).   
While significant advances have been made to address these concerns, the development 
of adolescent risk assessment tools has historically lagged behind that of adult risk assessment 
due to the unique considerations that arise in adolescent risk assessments (Borum, 2003).  In 
particular, risk assessments conducted with adolescents must be developmentally informed 
(Borum & Verhaagen, 2006; Hoge & Andrews, 1996) and account for differences in risk factors, 
behavioural norms, stability of individual factors, psychosocial maturity, and base rates of 
violence (Borum, 2000; Borum & Verhaagen, 2006).  Based on clinician surveys (Viljoen et al., 
2010), the most commonly used adolescent risk assessment tools include the Structured 
Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY; Borum, Bartel, & Forth, 2006) and the Youth 
Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (YLS/CMI; Hoge & Andrews, 2002; Hoge & 
Andrews, 2011).  
The Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY; Borum et al., 2006) is a 
structured professional judgement tool designed to assess the risk for violence in adolescents 
aged 12 to 18.  It includes 24 empirically supported risk factors for violence which are mostly 
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dynamic and divided into historical, individual, and social/contextual categories. Importantly, the 
SAVRY also includes six protective factors.  A unique feature of the SAVRY is its ability to 
include additional case-specific risk and protective factors which may be important in 
understanding the risk of a particular youth.  After considering the relative importance of each of 
the youth’s risk and protective factors, the evaluator uses these ratings to inform their judgement 
of the youth’s overall level of risk using a summary risk rating of low, moderate, or high (Borum 
et al., 2006; Borum et al., 2010).  
Research results currently available for the SAVRY are promising.  In particular, a meta-
analysis conducted by Olver, Stockdale, and Wormith (2009) has found the SAVRY to 
demonstrate good predictive accuracy for both general and violent recidivism (rw = .32 and .30, 
respectively).  Moreover, protective factors have been found to be predictive of desistance from 
reoffending (Lodewijks, Ruiter, & Doreleijers, 2010; Rennie & Dolan, 2010); for example, in 
one sample of high risk youth the violent recidivism rate for those with and without protective 
factors present was 6% and 40%, respectively (Lodewijks et al., 2010).  Furthermore, research 
demonstrates good to excellent inter-rater reliability with intra-class correlation coefficients 
ranging from .81 to .97 for SAVRY risk totals and .72 to .95 for SAVRY summary risk ratings 
(Borum et al., 2010).   
Alternatively, the Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (YLS/CMI; 
Hoge & Andrews, 2002; Hoge & Andrews, 2011) is one of several youth adapted versions of the 
Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R; Andrews & Bonta, 1995).  It is designed to assess 
the risk and need factors of adolescents, and to assist in effective case planning and management 
(Hoge & Andrews, 2002; Hoge & Andrews, 2011; Hoge, Andrews, & Leschied, 2002).  It is 
comprised of eight subscales containing a total of 42 empirically supported static and dynamic 
risk factors.  Importantly, unlike the SAVRY, the YLS/CMI is an adjusted actuarial tool which 
provides normative cut off scores to categorize the youth’s overall risk from low to very high.  
However, it also allows the evaluator to include additional factors relevant to the case and, 
consequently, to provide their professional judgement of the youth’s overall risk based on all of 
the available information (Hoge, 2005).  
Although it utilizes a different approach than the SAVRY, the YLS/CMI reports similar 
levels of predictive validity.  In particular, meta-analysis has shown that the YLS/CMI has good 
predictive accuracy; however, this is slightly better for general recidivism than violent recidivism 
(rw = .32 and .26, respectively; Olver et al., 2009).  Total scores obtained on the YLS/CMI have 
also been significantly correlated with serious reoffenses, the number of new offenses, and time 
until reoffense (Schmidt, Hoge, & Gomes, 2005).  Furthermore, intra-class correlations for the 
subscales and total scores of the YLS/CMI have generally been found to be adequate (Schmidt et 
al., 2005).  
In addition to the YLS/CMI, several other variants of the LSI-R have been developed 
for use in national and international contexts. In Canada, for example, researchers have 
developed the Level of Service Inventory – Ontario Revised (LSI-OR; Andrews, Bonta, & 
Wormith, 1995) and the Level of Service Inventory – Saskatchewan Edition (LSI-SK; Andrews, 
Bonta, & Wormith, 2001).  International adaptations have also been developed in countries such 
as Australia (YLS/CMI-AA; Hoge & Andrews, 1995).  While the YLS/CMI is often considered 
to be a representative illustration of these other adaptations due to the substantial overlap and 
THE SAVRY AND YLS/CMI IN ADOLESCENT COURT PROCEEDINGS   5 
 
similarity between them (Olver et al., 2009), some independent research has been conducted in 
order to evaluate the validity of these tools within their respective populations.  In particular, 
recent research by Luong and Wormith (2011) has suggested that total scores on the LSI-SK are 
also strongly predictive of overall recidivism (r = .39, p < .001).   
 Although research supports the predictive validity of both the SAVRY and the YLS/CMI 
(Olver et al., 2009), several studies that have directly compared the predictive validity of these 
two tools suggest that the SAVRY may outperform the YLS/CMI in its ability to predict general 
reoffending (Schmidt, Campbell, & Houlding, 2011; Welsh, Schmidt, McKinnon, Chattha, & 
Meyers, 2008).  In particular, research by Schmidt, Campbell, and Houlding (2011) has shown 
that the SAVRY has significant predictive validity for general recidivism with an AUC score of 
.74 compared to an YLS/CMI score of .66.  Consequently, this suggests that the YLS/CMI may 
be somewhat less efficient at predicting long term recidivism rates when compared to the 
SAVRY (Schmidt et al., 2011).  
The Present Case Law Review 
 Although the above review demonstrates the prevalence of empirical support for 
adolescent risk assessment tools in clinical and forensic settings, we lack knowledge concerning 
the use of these tools within court cases involving adolescent offenders.  For instance, we do not 
know how frequently risk assessment tools are used in adolescent cases and in what context, or 
how the courts use this information to inform their decisions.  A recent case law review 
examined the use of two widely-used adult risk assessment tools – the Violence Risk Appraisal 
Guide (VRAG; Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998) and the Historical Clinical Risk-20 
(HCR-20; Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997) – in 46 court cases and found that these tools 
are typically used in cases concerning a sexually violent offender’s commitment or release from 
a secure setting to parole (Vitacco, Erickson, Kurus, & Apple, 2012).  Similar reviews have also 
examined the use of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003; DeMatteo & 
Edens, 2006) and the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007; Mullen & Edens, 
2008).  However, to date, no similar reviews have been conducted in the context of adolescent 
risk assessment. 
 In addition to how these tools are used, it is also currently unclear whether legal 
challenges have arisen regarding the use of the SAVRY and YLS/CMI in adolescent court cases. 
In terms of admissibility, various legal standards exist across jurisdictions and countries.1  For 
instance, in Canada, in order to be considered admissible, evidence must be deemed relevant to 
the legal issue at hand and necessary in assisting the trier of fact; there must be no exclusionary 
rule prohibiting its admission; and it must be provided by a qualified expert (R v. Mohan, 1994).  
In the United States, the Daubert standard states that expert testimony must reflect scientific 
knowledge and be derived through scientific methods (Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993).  Alternatively, the Frye standard, which is relied on in some states, 
emphasizes that experts’ evidence must be relevant to the issue at hand and commonly accepted 
(Frye v. United States, 1923).  In the United Kingdom, expert testimony must be given by a 
qualified expert in the field, be provided objectively and in an unbiased manner, and meet the 
                                                 
1 It is outside the scope of this article to review the full range of legal standards.  In order to illustrate the range of 
standards, some examples have been provided.  However, readers are referred to Brautbar (1999) and Law 
Commission (2011) for more information.  
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threshold for evidentiary reliability (Great Britain Law Commission, 2011).  Thus, admissibility 
standards often refer to the scientific validity of measures and approaches.  
 While it is likely that both the SAVRY and YLS/CMI meet these basic admissibility 
criteria due to their strong research support and necessity as an alternative to unstructured 
clinical judgement, it is possible that other questions and concerns arise regarding the use of 
these tools in legal contexts.  For instance, some legal and social science scholars have raised 
concerns about the potential for ‘statistical justice’ to occur when dispositions are determined 
according to the results of an actuarial risk assessment, rather than as a proportional response to 
the actual offense (Cole, 2007; Maurutto & Hannah-Moffat, 2007).  Moreover, others have 
raised important questions concerning stigmatization and the negative impact of labelling youth 
as high risk (Bernburg, Khron, & Rivera, 2006; Viljoen et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2008); the 
possible failure of some tools to recognize adolescents’ risk as dynamic and changeable (Borum, 
2000); and the relative lack of research on the utility of risk assessment tools in youth belonging 
to minority groups (Maurutto & Hannah-Moffat, 2007).  
 In order to fill these gaps within the current literature and provide more information to 
mental health professionals who conduct risk assessments for the courts, this article reviewed 
published and unpublished court cases involving adolescent offenders to examine the following: 
(a) how frequently adolescent risk assessment tools such as the SAVRY and YLS/CMI are used 
in court cases; (b) how these tools are used, such as what types of cases they are used in; (c) how 
much weight is placed on the risk assessment in judges’ rationale for their decisions; and (d) 
whether there have been legal concerns or challenges associated with these tools. Where 
relevant, we include a narrative description of these key issues in order to provide more specific 
details, such as the specific nature of the legal challenges that arose.  
Method 
 In order to capture a broad scope of cases, our search included cases originating from 
Canada, the United States, and internationally.  Canadian cases were searched for using 
LawSource (also referred to as Westlaw, Canadian version), which captures reported and 
unreported federal and provincial case law2; as well as CanLii, which contains Canadian case 
law and statutes3. We searched for American cases with LexisNexis which includes reported and 
unreported decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeal, as well as  
some state court decisions, usually those from the appellate and high courts4.  Finally, other 
international cases were searched for using databases which are accessible from CanLii including 
WorldLii5, AustLii 6, and CommonLii7.  Although not all cases involving adolescent offenders 
                                                 
2 More information can be found at http://www.westlawecarswell.com/lawsource/. 
3 More information on CanLii coverage can be found at http://www.canlii.org/en/databases.html. 
4 More information on case coverage in Lexis Nexis can be found at http://w3.nexis.com/sources/. 
5 WorldLii, in partnership with AustLii, provides coverage of more than 1200 legal databases from 123 jurisdictions 
worldwide. A complete list of countries and databases can be found at http://www.worldlii.org/databases.html.  
6 AustLii provides access to more than 500 databases from the Australasian jurisdictions, including Australia, 
Tasmania, and New Zealand. More information can be found on http://www.austlii.edu.au/databases.html. 
7 CommonLii provides access to more than 950 databases from Commonwealth and common law jurisdictions 
including many African, Asian, Australasian, Caribbean, Central American, European, North American, South 
American, and Pacific Island countries. For a complete list of included countries and databases, information is 
available at http://www.commonlii.org/databases.html.  
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include written decisions that are available in legal databases, these cases can provide an 
important window into how these risk assessment tools are being used and the potential issues or 
concerns that may arise. 
 To identify relevant cases, we used a variety of search terms including: Structured 
Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth, Structure Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth, 
SAVRY, Youth Level Service, Youth Level of Service Inventory, Level of Service Inventory, 
YLS, and YLS/CMI.  Furthermore, because the focus of this review is on adolescent court cases, 
we specified that cases must include the term youth, adolescent, or juvenile.  Our search included 
all available cases up until August 1, 2013.  
 Our search initially identified 49 Canadian cases, 19 American Cases, and 5 international 
cases.  However, upon examination many of these cases appeared to involve individuals who 
were adults at the time of the offense; it is likely that these cases were captured by our search due 
to the inclusion of the phrase level of service inventory, which is also used to refer to the adult 
LSI-R risk assessment tool, and because the terms adolescent, juvenile, and youth are often used 
in the context of discussing offense history.  As a result, in order to be included in our sample we 
carefully reviewed all cases to ensure that (a) the defendant was 17 years old or younger at the 
time of the offense, and (b) that the risk assessment was completed using either the SAVRY or a 
youth specific adaptation of the LSI-R.  Where it could not be clearly determined whether the 
Level of Service Inventory was a youth or adult adaptation, we eliminated these cases.   
 Following the identification of relevant cases, cases were coded using a standardized 
coding form developed and agreed upon by both authors, and based on previous research 
(Viljoen, MacDougall, Gagnon, & Douglas, 2010).  This form included the following: (a) 
characteristics of the case including the type of legal proceeding and the country of origin; (b) 
the statements made within the case about the applicable risk assessment tool; (c) specific 
characteristics of the offender including their age and current charges; (d) the judge’s statements 
about the risk assessment tool in making their decision (if applicable); and (e) the challenges or 
disputes associated with the use of risk assessment tools in the proceedings (if applicable).  
 Coding was completed by the first author in collaboration with the other author. In order 
to examine interrater reliability of the coding, an undergraduate Psychology student with training 
in research methods coded 10 randomly selected cases using the same standardized coding form.  
We examined interrater reliability for variables which were both factual (e.g., type of legal 
proceeding) and subjective (e.g., how much weight the judge placed on the risk assessment in 
their decision) in nature.  As shown in Table 1, interrater reliability was substantial or better for 
all items (i.e.,  > .80; Landis & Koch, 1977), with a mean item kappa of .95 (range .80 to 1.00).  
 However, while an important aspect of this review is to determine the frequency in which 
adolescent risk assessment tools are used within juvenile court proceedings, case law reviews 
such as this are only able to capture a handful of legal cases (i.e., Mullen & Edens, 2008, Vitacco 
et al., 2012; Viljoen et al., 2010).  This occurs for multiple reasons. First of all, many cases do 
not have written decisions; therefore, our search is limited to cases in which the judge has 
provided a written decision.  Secondly, most legal cases are not reported or published in legal 
databases.  It is important to note that this distinction does not refer to whether the case is 
available to the public, but whether the decision is published and circulated for commercial 
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purposes (Arnold, 1999).  Furthermore, when the court believes that a particular case does not 
have precedential value or does not add substantively to the relevant body of law, the court can 
reserve the case as unpublished (in the United States) or unreported (in Canada).  Although they 
are occasionally found in legal databases such as LexisNexis, unpublished cases have no binding 
precedential value but may instead be considered to be persuasive authority in some limited 
jurisdictions.  Given this distinction, the results of this review are likely to over represent cases 
which have highly influential and potentially controversial outcomes, and significantly 
underrepresent cases which have typical or run-of-the-mill outcomes, or which do not reach 
higher levels of the court system.  
Results 
Frequency of Use in Court Cases 
 Our search resulted in a total of 50 cases which mentioned adolescent risk assessment 
tools such as the SAVRY or YLS/CMI.  In addition to the SAVRY and YLS/CMI, our search 
terms also revealed several cases which mentioned the LSI-SK, a youth adaptation of the LSI-R 
specific to the province of Saskatchewan which has a substantial amount of similarity in item 
content with the YLS/CMI, as well as minimal differences in predictive accuracy (Olver et al., 
2009).  As such, we chose to group these two risk assessment tools (i.e., YLS/CMI and LSI-SK) 
together when evaluating our results.  
 Of the 50 cases that we identified, there were 34 Canadian and 12 American decisions, as 
well as 4 international cases originating from the United Kingdom and Australia.  The earliest 
available case occurred in 2003 (see Figure 1).  Furthermore, the SAVRY and YLS/CMI were 
mentioned in a similar number of cases; the SAVRY was mentioned in 27 cases (46.6%, n = 58) 
whereas the YLS/CMI and LSI-SK, were mentioned a total of 31 times (53.4%, n = 58).  Eight 
cases mentioned both the YLS/CMI and the SAVRY.  
Contexts in Which They are Used 
 Types of Cases. The most common context in which adolescent risk assessment tools 
were used was in sentencing and/or disposition hearings (see Table 2).  However, they were also 
frequently used in cases of adult certification or transfer to criminal court in the United States 
and adult sentencing in youth courts in Canada, respectively.8  Importantly, those cases in the US 
which involved adult certification or transfer to criminal court were also appeals made by the 
youth and their counsel.  Less frequently, adolescent risk assessment tools were used in cases 
concerned with applications to extend and/or continue custody and with dangerous offender 
applications.  Finally, there was also a single case in which the use of the LSI-SK in the 
sentencing of a youth was appealed by Crown counsel.   
 Types of Offenders and Offenses.  In addition to being used in a wide variety of legal 
proceedings, adolescent risk assessment tools were also used to evaluate a variety of young 
offenders.  Based on the information available in the cases, the mean age at time of offense of the 
assessed youth was 15.7 (n = 45).  Furthermore, 42 of the youth in these cases were males, 7 
                                                 
8 In Canada, adolescents are not transferred to adult court per se; instead, youth courts can directly provide adult 
sentences. Under some circumstances an application for adult sentencing must be heard and decided upon (Youth 
Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1). 
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were females, and in one case, the offender’s gender was unclear.  Although information about 
the ethnicity of these youth was often not explicitly mentioned in court cases, in nine cases the 
youth was identified as being of Aboriginal descent.  Within this sample of cases, most youth 
were charged with violent or other serious offenses (see Table 3).  The most common index 
offense was robbery or theft (20.3%, n = 16); however, a number of youth were charged with 
serious violent offenses including assault (12.6%, n = 10), sexual assault (7.6%, n = 6), 
manslaughter (6.3%, n = 5), and murder (10.1%, n = 8).  
 Types of Evaluators.  Within this sample of cases, SAVRY and YLS/CMI assessments 
were completed by evaluators with a variety of professional designations (see Table 4).  In 
particular, evaluators were most commonly mental health professionals including psychologists 
(33.3%, n = 17) and psychiatrists (15.7%, n = 8).  Other evaluators included youth workers 
(9.8%, n = 5) and probation officers (5.9%, n = 3).  However, information concerning the 
professional designation of the evaluator was not available in 33.3% (n = 17) of all cases, as 
written decisions do not always contain all of the case relevant information.   
 Statements Made about the Risk Assessment.  In approximately 41% of cases (n = 21), 
the judge provided a direct quote or statement by the evaluator, or provided their own statement 
about the specific risk factors that increased the adolescent’s likelihood of general or violent 
reoffending (See Table 5).  In terms of the SAVRY, the risk factors identified by the tool were 
specifically described in 40.7% of cases (n = 11).  For example, some of the specific risk factors 
identified in these cases include association with criminal or antisocial peers (e.g., R. v. Bird, 
2008; R. v. D. (T.P.), 2009; R. v. Skeete, 2013), negative attitudes (e.g., J.T.L, Re., 2005; R v. 
D.M., 2005; Y.C., Re., 2005; R. v. C.W.W., 2006; DBW (a child) -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA, 2011; R. v. Skeete, 2013), drug or alcohol abuse (e.g., J.T.L, Re., 2005; R. v D. 
(T.P.), 2009; R v. T. (D.D.), 2009; R v. Skeete, 2013), low empathy or remorse (e.g., J.T.L, Re., 
2005; R v. Skeete, 2013), impulsiveness (e.g., Y.C., Re., 2005; R. v. T. (D.D.), 2009), and poor 
coping skills (e.g., Y.C., Re., 2005; R. v. T. (D.D.), 2009; R v. Skeete, 2013).  
 Similarly, specific to the YLS/CMI or LSI-SK, the individual risk identified by the tool 
were mentioned 32.3% (n = 10) of the time.  In particular, some of the most commonly 
mentioned factors included a history of prior offenses (e.g., R. v. D. (T.P.), 2009; R v. Skeete, 
2013), substance abuse (e.g., R. v. D. (T.P.), 2009; R. v. W. (A.), 2009; R. v. D. (B.H.), 2006; R v. 
Skeete, 2013), negative peer relations (e.g., R. v. D. (T.P.), 2009; R. v. T. (T.W.), 2007; R. v. W. 
(A.), 2009; R. v. D. (B.H.), 2006; R. v. R.H., 2013), and education or employment (e.g., R. v. T. 
(T.W.), 2007; R. v. W. (A.), 2009; R. v. D. (B.H.), 2006).  Furthermore, of these cases, only three 
directly identified these risk factors as being dynamic and amenable to change.  For example, in 
R v. Skeete (2013) the presiding judge, in summarizing the report notes that the youth’s 
“[d]ynamic factors […] may be amenable to change over time if addressed through treatment or 
by altering [the] environment (para. 154).”  
 In approximately 20% of cases (n = 11) judges went on to address the specific protective 
factors or strengths of the youth, as identified by the risk assessment tools (see Table 5).  For 
example, in summarizing the results of the SAVRY, judges emphasized protective factors such 
as pro-social involvement and strong social support from adults (R. v. B. (L.A.), 2007; DBW (a 
child) -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, 2011) as well as strong attachment and 
bonds (Regina v. AJC, 2010; DBW (a child) -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, 2011; 
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R. v. T. (B.), 2013).  Furthermore, important strengths identified by the judge in summarizing the 
results of the YLS/CMI or LSI-SK were empathy and cognitive ability (e.g., R. v. T. (T.W.), 
2007), family circumstances and parenting, prosocial attitudes, and a limited criminal history 
(e.g., R. v. D. (B.H.), 2006).  However, in some cases judges mentioned the apparent and 
complete lack of protective factors or strengths identified by the risk assessment tool (e.g., J.T.L, 
Re., 2005; Y.C., Re., 2005; R. v. C.W.W., 2006; R. v. H. (M.A.), 2006; R v. Skeete, 2013) and even 
suggest that this lack of protective factors is evidence that the youth is especially high risk and 
has a poor prognosis for rehabilitation (e.g., J.T.L, Re., 2005; Y.C., Re., 2005). 
 In addition to addressing the specific risk and protective factors, the judges in 48 of the 
50 cases also stated or quoted the overall or summary risk rating provided by the assessment. 
While not explicitly mentioned by the judge, an interesting pattern amongst those cases which 
utilized more than one of the SAVRY and YLS/CMI was that there was a consistent level of 
agreement between these tools.  In particular, six of the eight cases which used more than one 
tool rated the youth at the same level of risk to reoffend (e.g., Julianna B, 2007; M.J. (J.), Re, 
2010; R. v. B. (L.A.), 2007; R. v. Bird, 2008; R. v. D. (T.P.), 2009; R. v. T. (T.W.), 2007; R. v. 
Skeete, 2013; R. v. T.(B.), 2013).  However, there was some difference between the outcomes of 
these tools; for example, in the case of R. v. H. (P.) (2005), the evaluator used three tests 
including the YLS/CMI and the SAVRY; using the YLS/CMI he concluded that the youth was at 
a high risk for general reoffending while on the SAVRY he concluded that the youth was only at 
moderate risk for violent offending.    
 Finally, these cases also provide some evidence that courts may prefer these tools 
compared to unstructured clinical judgement.  For example, this was espoused in R. v. Casavant 
(2009) in which two psychiatrists evaluated the risk of an adolescent to reoffend.  The first 
evaluator concluded that the youth is at high risk to reoffend based on his general opinion.  This 
was consistent with the findings of the other psychiatrist who employed the SAVRY and also 
rated the youth as an overall high risk.  Considering their findings, the judge concluded that the 
opinion of the psychiatrist who employed the SAVRY was more convincing because it stood up 
under cross-examination and did not change radically over the course of time, unlike that of the 
psychiatrist who cited only his professional opinion.   
Weight in Decision Making 
 In explaining their decision about the relevant legal issue, judges directly referred to the 
conducted risk assessment in nearly half of cases (46.0%, n = 23; see Table 6).  However, in 
terms of the actual weight that judges placed on these statements in forming their decisions, the 
use of this evidence was highly variable.  Typically, judges were most likely to place some 
weight on the risk assessment and considered it to be one of many relevant factors. For instance, 
in the case of R. v. C.W.W. (2006, para. 44) the judge determined that a juvenile sentence was not 
sufficient to account for the evidence presented by the psychiatrist who conducted the risk 
assessment, the seriousness of the offense, or public safety.  The risk assessments were also 
sometimes considered in cases as one of many factors in achieving sentencing goals.  In 
particular, this included achieving and maintaining the least restrictive alternative.  For instance, 
in M.J.(J.), Re (2010; para. 42), the judge determined that the youth continued to pose a threat to 
public safety partly due to the outcome of the risk assessment, which stated that he was a low to 
moderate risk to reoffend, but that this risk was likely to be heightened if he was in an 
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unstructured environment.  Similarly, minimizing the risk presented in the risk assessment report 
through appropriate sentencing (e.g., custodial vs. non-custodial) was also one of many factors 
considered in several other cases (e.g., J.A.R., A JUVENILE, 2011; J.T.S, 2008; R. v. B. (L.A.), 
2007; R. v. Bird, 2008; R. v. Casavant, 2009; R. v. D. (T.P.), 2009); R. v. W.(A.), 2009; R. v. H. 
(M.A.), 2006; T. (C.), Re, 2012; IN THE MATTER OF: I.S.P., Adjudicated Delinquent Child, 
2010). 
 However, these risk assessment outcomes also appeared to hold even greater weight in a 
small proportion of cases (4.0%, n = 2).  For instance, in the case of J.(M.), Re (2010) the court 
affirmed an application to continue the custody of a youth pursuant to the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act (2002).  In the decision, the judge concluded that the youth was likely to commit a serious 
violent offence if released to the community before the expiry of his sentence.  This was largely 
based on evidence presented by the SAVRY which placed him at a high risk to reoffend 
violently.  
Concerns or Legal Challenges 
 In 22.0% of cases (n = 11), concerns or challenges about the use of risk assessment tools 
in adolescent legal proceedings were raised.  These legal challenges were most often raised by 
judges (18.0% of all cases, n = 9) and only sometimes by prosecutors (2.0% of all cases, n = 1) 
and by defense counsel (2.0% of all cases, n = 1).  Although risk assessment tools were subject 
to legal challenges in only one fifth of cases, a few salient themes appeared which could have 
significant importance for influencing later cases.  
 Of the cases which raised legal concerns about the use of these risk assessment tools in 
adolescent legal proceedings (n = 11), six of them were particularly concerned with how these 
tools may be inappropriately used to guide sentencing following adjudication.  This was 
particularly relevant for Canadian cases utilizing the LSI-SK.  For instance, this issue is raised in 
the case of R. v. D. (M.D.) (2004) in which the sentencing judge contends that the risk 
assessment “may inadvertently become a tool for sentencing the young person, not for what 
[they have] done but for what [they] might do (para. 39)” and consequently, “that the objectives 
and approach taken in the LSI-SK Youth ED. [...] appear to be somewhat at odds with the 
sentencing principles under the YCJA (para. 40).” This contention is also presented by the judge 
in R. v. G. (H.W.) (2003) who argues that while the risk assessment report may be well meaning, 
“there is a danger that [...] we may impose conditions [...] which unnecessarily interfere with the 
young person’s liberty (para. 38).”  
 However, of the cases which raised legal concerns (n = 11), six of them were decided by 
the same judge (R. v. G. (H.W.), 2003; R. v. D. (M.D.), 2004; R. v. C. (K.L.), 2004; R. v. R. 
(S.M.), 2004; R. v. D. (T.P.), 2009; R. v. R.H., 2013).  Overall, his opinion about the admissibility 
of risk assessments in adolescent court proceedings can be summarized from his decision in R. v. 
R. (S.M.) (2004) in which he argues that “risk/need total scores should not be used in the 
determination of dispositions [because] the use of actuarial tools in sentencing could amount to 
statistical justice [emphasis added] (Reichman, 1986) (para. 48).”  He observes that the logic of 
risk assessment contradicts the purpose and principles of sentencing contained in the YCJA 
(2002) because “risk/need scores are not a measure of the seriousness of an offence, [...] nor is 
future crime relevant to proportionality (para. 48).”  Instead, he notes that “from a sentencing 
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judge's perspective the interest in risk assessment information lies in the reliable identification of 
needs and an effective response to those needs (para. 49)” and concludes that,  
 “Assessment of the risk to re-offend must not be confused with the very valid purpose of 
this Act [YCJA, 2002] which is to address the circumstances underlying the young 
person's offending behaviour. Nor should it be allowed to influence sentencing decisions 
because rehabilitation and reintegration are central to sentencing. Based on the foregoing 
reasoning, I am not prepared to consider the Young Person's assessed risk to re-offend in 
arriving at the appropriate sentence. I am concerned about the dangers of misusing of the 
risk assessment and the potential for prejudice to the young person (para. 52).” 
Due to these challenges, the risk assessment was dismissed or considered inadmissible by the 
court in many of these cases (e.g., R. v. B. (D.H.), 2006; R v. R. (S.M.), 2004; and R. v. P. (T.D.), 
2004).  
 Related to sentencing, another concern raised in one of the cases was the appropriateness 
of using risk assessment tools to assess a youth’s prior record of delinquency during adult 
certification procedures. In particular, in the case of J. R. L., Child (2009) the trial judge used 
clinical reports and SAVRY results to determine whether the juvenile had a sufficient prior 
record of delinquency to warrant adult certification; a decision which was ultimately appealed by 
defense counsel. The appeal judge concluded that the “SAVRY ratings [were] not part of [the] 
appellant’s juvenile record of adjudications,” and therefore, that it was inappropriate to conclude 
that the juvenile had a prior record of delinquency based on evidence of “a multitude of factors 
that substantially increased [his] risk for future acts of delinquency.”  Although the appeal judge 
determined that the court had abused its discretion by including this information in the prior 
record of delinquency record, he concluded that this was not enough to reverse the adult 
certification, and the trial court’s decision was affirmed.   
 Although the concerns associated with considering risk assessment results at the 
sentencing stage (ie. following adjudication) were most often raised by judges, the admissibility 
of these tools was also challenged by counsel in the case of R. v. Q. (K.) (2006). In this appeal, 
the Crown applied to reverse the rulings of two judges who concluded that pre-sentence reports 
which are conducted for sentencing hearings must not contain any reference to risk assessment, 
and in particular, the LSI-SK. This is to say that because Youth Justice Court Judges, in 
accordance with the YJCA, automatically receive pre-sentence reports when considering a 
custodial sentence, (YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 39), it is feared that this information will be used as an 
aggravating circumstance when crafting a young person’s sentence. However, on this matter the 
judge deferred to the affidavit of the Provincial Director who stated that,   
“it is made clear in the Purpose and Methodology introduction in each pre-sentence 
report that the pre-sentence report is to provide information for the youth justice court to 
assist in determining appropriate sentencing alternatives in accordance with the Act, and 
that any reference to the assessed likelihood to re-offend is not intended to constitute a 
recommendation as to type of sentence or length of sentence; for example, an assessed 
high likelihood to re-offend should not be viewed as indicating a custody sentence (para. 
12).” 
THE SAVRY AND YLS/CMI IN ADOLESCENT COURT PROCEEDINGS   13 
 
Consequently, the judge concluded that the Youth Justice Court Judge was not authorized to 
determine the contents of the pre-sentence report by excluding the LSI-SK, and permitted the 
inclusion of the risk assessment report during the sentencing hearing.   
 Additionally, another salient legal concern raised by the courts was the subjective 
reporting associated with these risk assessment tools. For instance, the judge in R. v. G. (H.W.) 
(2003) argued that “while the [LSI-SK Youth Edition] may be more scientific and reliable in 
assessing risk than personal opinion, it may nonetheless be subject to error (para. 32).” In this 
particular case he questioned the evaluator’s conclusion that the youth had no “emotional or 
mental health issues and […] no diagnosed learning disabilities.” As a possible remedy to this 
issue, he suggests that “it would be useful for the court [...] to have access to the information 
used for completion of this risk assessment tool (para. 33).”  
 Finally, in one case the importance of obtaining consent from the youth before 
conducting the risk assessment was raised. In particular, this was seen in the case of R. v. D. 
(B.H.) (2006) in which the youth was not directly informed that the purpose of the assessment 
was to include a risk assessment in the pre-sentence report, and therefore, was not able to provide 
informed consent for the inclusion of that information in the sentencing proceedings.  As a 
consequence, the report was considered by the judge to be inadmissible for the proceedings, and 
provided no weight on the risk assessment or pre-sentence report in his decision making.  
Discussion 
 In order to acquire a greater understanding of how risk assessment tools such as the 
SAVRY and YLS/CMI are used in adolescent court cases, we searched and reviewed Canadian, 
American, and international cases in which these tools were used to examine a juvenile offender 
for their future risk to reoffend.  Our search revealed that these tools have been introduced as 
evidence in 50 instances, including 34 Canadian, 12 American, and 4 international cases.  
However, as previously mentioned, this type of review is limited in its ability to provide absolute 
numbers of cases which use these tools.  In particular, most cases do not include written 
decisions by the judge and/or are not available in legal databases.  As such, this review is best 
suited to show patterns of usage and potential issues and concerns.  
 Overall, the results of this review suggest that the courts generally respond positively to 
these tools. This is evidenced by the continued use of these tools in adolescent court proceedings 
over the past decade; the use of both actuarial (YLS/CMI) and structured professional judgement 
(SAVRY) tools; the wide range of offenses and legal proceedings in which they are utilized; the 
attention paid to risk and protective factors in adolescents; the references made to these tools 
during the decision making process; and the generally successful admission of these tools as 
evidence without any apparent contentions or concerns.  
 Based on this sample of cases there does not seem to be a growing preference for a 
specific tool.  In particular, the SAVRY was utilized in 46.6% (n = 27) of cases while the 
YLS/CMI and LSI-SK were used in 53.4% (n = 31), including eight cases which mentioned both 
the SAVRY and the YLS/CMI.  This is generally consistent with surveys which demonstrate that 
many clinicians believe tools based on structured professional judgement and actuarial (or 
adjusted actuarial) models are both useful in conducting risk assessments (Viljoen et al., 2010).  
In addition, this review also found that there was consistent agreement between evaluators using 
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the SAVRY and the YLS/CMI.  This is important because it corresponds with research findings 
which demonstrate that these tools often have high correlations (Catchpole & Gretton, 2003). 
However, it is important to remember that while these tools are highly correlated, this does not 
suggest that a youth who scores high on both measures poses a doubly high risk.  
 This review also provided some insight into how adolescent risk assessment tools are 
used in legal proceedings.  In particular, the SAVRY, YLS/CMI, and LSI-SK were often used 
during the sentencing or disposition stage following adjudication.  This is particularly important 
because risk assessment outcomes have previously been shown to be highly relevant in affecting 
juvenile court decision making and that there is a significant association between the outcomes 
of these assessments and the sentence which adolescents receive (Lodewijks, Doreleijers, & De 
Ruiter, 2008).  In addition, adolescent risk assessment tools were also used in cases of adult 
certification in the US, and adult sentencing in Canada.  The emphasis of risk assessments in 
such cases is often a youths’ long-term risk; however, thus far relatively little evidence exists 
regarding the ability of adolescent risk assessment tools to predict long-term risk (Edens & 
Cahill, 2007; Worling, Bookalam, & Litteljohn, 2012).  Although adolescents’ risk may be quite 
dynamic, some studies do suggest that long-term predictions with these tools may be possible in 
some cases (Schmidt et al., 2011; Olver, Stockdale, & Wong, 2012).  
 Although all of the cases included in this law review made reference to a risk assessment 
conducted using at least one of the SAVRY, YLS/CMI, or LSI-SK, only an approximate one 
third of these cases referenced the specific risk factors that were salient for each of these 
adolescents. This could be due to the nature of the legal proceedings; because the majority of 
cases utilizing these tools were interested in sentencing, it is likely that court officials were 
highly interested in the overall risk of the youth to reoffend, but not the specific dynamic needs 
that should be addressed through treatment and management.  When they were addressed, the 
most commonly mentioned risk factors included criminal or antisocial peer relationships, drug or 
alcohol abuse, and education or employment.  Importantly, protective factors and strengths 
identified by the SAVRY and YLS/CMI assessments were considered approximately 29.6% and 
9.7% of the time, respectively.  This is significant because protective factors have been shown to 
buffer or mitigate risk to reoffend violently (Lodewijks et al., 2010; Rennie & Dolan, 2010).  In 
particular, violent reoffending is significantly higher for youth when protective factors are absent 
compared to when they are present (Lodewijks et al., 2010).  However, it is also possible that 
these factors were considered more often in these cases but were not formally published in their 
opinions.  
 Overall, the findings of this review present mixed results as to how much weight is 
placed upon risk assessments in adolescent legal proceedings.  Generally, it appears that the 
relative importance given to these risk assessment outcomes is dependent on the case.  For 
instance, judges placed no clear weight or disregarded the evidence surrounding the risk 
assessment in 38% of the cases.  When they did consider the risk assessment in their decision, 
judges were most likely to place some weight on this information by including it amongst a 
multitude of other relevant factors.  Consistent with previous findings that assessments are often 
relevant to decision making during the sentencing stages (Lodewijks et al., 2008), this was often 
the case in sentencing or disposition hearings and adult certification and transfer in both Canada 
and the US.  However, judges did place clear emphasis on the importance of the risk assessment 
in coming to their decision in a limited number of cases. For instance, the risk assessment 
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appeared to be an important and heavily weighted factor in applications related to continuing or 
extending custody. 
 Finally, this review revealed that there have also been several salient legal challenges 
associated with the admission of risk assessment tools as evidence.  In particular, the most 
pervasive of these challenges arose in Canadian cases as a result of the apparent conflict between 
the nature and logic of risk assessment and the sentencing principles presented by the YCJA 
(2002).  According to the purposes and principles of sentencing outlined in the Act, any sentence 
which is delivered to a youth must not be greater than the punishment an adult would receive for 
the same offense; be similar to comparable cases; proportionate to the seriousness of the offense 
and culpability of the youth; consider all reasonable sanctions other than custody; and the 
sentence must be the least restrictive alternative which is the most likely to rehabilitate and 
promote a sense of responsibility in the youth (YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 38).  In terms of these 
sentencing principles, the concerns associated with risk assessment tools appears to be with its 
appropriateness in informing the severity and nature of the sentence.  In particular, judges in this 
review have expressed concern that youth could essentially be penalized for acts they have not 
yet committed but are simply judged to be at risk for, and furthermore, that the results of a risk 
assessment could be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing.  
 Thus, the role and weight of risk assessments in informing sentencing appears to be a 
difficult issue that courts need to grapple with.  On the one hand, risk assessment tools may 
potentially help judges to make decisions concerning the disposition of a juvenile offender which 
would provide the best prospect for reducing future offending (Grisso & Vincent, 2005).  This is 
especially important given that public protection is typically a paramount goal.  Importantly, 
however, these tools do not contain normative cut off scores which would suggest one 
sentencing outcome over another, and there are numerous other considerations. Thus, they 
cannot and should not be used as a sole basis for these opinions.  Consistent with this, the results 
of this case law review indicated that judges typically place some weight on risk assessments, as 
a part of an enumerated list of other relevant factors, rather than basing their decisions solely on 
this evidence.   
Limitations and Future Directions  
 In order to provide an examination of how adolescent risk assessment tools such as the 
SAVRY and YLS/CMI are used in court, we conducted a broad search of Canadian, American, 
and international case law databases and included a broad range of types of legal proceedings. 
This allowed us to obtain a total of 50 cases predominantly including sentencing or disposition 
hearings and appeals of adult certification and transfer decisions.  However, the nature of this 
search is associated with some important limitations.  First of all, this review is only able to 
capture cases which have written decisions.  Moreover, because most cases contained in legal 
databases are published cases which have been deemed to have significant precedential value, it 
is likely that our results are over-representative of contentious cases and significantly under-
representative of more typical cases.  As a result, it is possible that these risk assessment tools 
are being utilized in different ways or more often than this review has revealed.  Consequently, it 
will be important for future research to conduct a more exhaustive review, possibly by including 
court transcripts or gaining access to additional international legal databases.   
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  Secondly, although our sample size is larger than sample sizes of comparable case law 
surveys of adult risk assessment tools (Vitacco et al., 2012), another important limitation of this 
case law review is the limited number of available cases using the SAVRY and YLS/CMI (n = 
50).  Through our search, we discovered that this may be the case due to the existence of 
multiple regional, provincial, and state specific adaptations of these tools, often without proper 
empirical support (Hannah-Moffit & Maurutto, 2003; Vincent et al., 2009).  Consequently, 
although we attempted to focus on only the SAVRY and YLS/CMI, in order to increase our 
sample of cases we searched for additional cases by including youth adaptations of the LSI-R 
other than the YLS/CMI.  This expansion of the search terms revealed several cases using the 
LSI-SK, an adaptation of the YLS/CMI used in Saskatchewan which is empirically similar to the 
YLS/CMI (Hannah-Moffit & Maurutto, 2003).  However, it is important to note that there are 
additional adaptations currently in use, particularly in the Canadian court systems.  For example, 
prominent LSI-R adaptations include the LSI-OR, developed and used in Ontario (Hannah-
Moffit & Maurutto, 2003), as well as the YLS/CMI Australian adaptation (YLS/CMI-AA; Hoge 
& Andrews, 1995).  Although our search was not able to locate cases using these tools in 
particular, it will be important for future research to include a broader range of risk assessment 
tools in order to develop a more robust picture of how these risk assessment tools are being used.  
 In order to increase the size of our sample and to glean additional information about the 
use of these tools in adolescent court proceedings, we searched for and included international 
cases whenever possible.  However, while this is an important strength of this review it is 
essential to note that many countries differ considerably in their legal systems and standards of 
admissibility.  For instance, the United States is considered to have a more punishment and 
retribution oriented sentencing philosophy than countries such as Canada (Doob & Webster, 
2006); although recent legal reforms in the United States have softened this somewhat (Roper v. 
Simmons, 2005).  Furthermore, the countries included in this review all utilize common law 
systems which tend to be primarily adversarial in nature.9  These adversarial systems tend to 
result in significant challenges for expert testimony, including the potential for experts to become 
“hired guns;” unconscious bias amongst paid experts; and selection bias by attorneys who choose 
their own experts (Bernstein, 2007).  While admissibility standards such as Daubert (Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993) attempt to mitigate the potential for these problems 
(Bernstein, 2007), it is possible that our results may have been impacted by these issues. As such, 
it will be important for future research to also explore the use of risk assessment tools in 
countries with inquisitorial systems of law, and the impact that the differences between these 
systems has on the use and admissibility of these tools.  
 Finally, it is important to note that the results of this review are limited by the amount and 
type of information provided by the judge in the written decision.  Specifically, it is often the 
case that judges do not provide all of the information relevant to a case or their judgement in 
their written decision.  As such, it is possible that the outcome or details of the risk assessment 
may have been discussed more thoroughly in court than is portrayed in the written decision.  For 
example, the specific risk and protective factors of youth may have been discussed more often 
                                                 
9 The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada use a primarily adversarial system in which two 
opposing parties face a neutral judge and/or jury.  However, there are some exceptions.  For instance, in Canada the 
province of Quebec is bijuridicial; civil matters are regulated using a civil law system, whereas criminal matters are 
regulated through the common law system.  
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and in more detail than the results of this review suggest.  Moreover, this could have important 
implications for our assessment of the weight that judges place on risk assessment tools during 
the decision making process.  Consequently, the results of this review should be interpreted with 
caution and are best used to show patterns of use and potential concerns.  
Implications 
 Although the purpose of this case law review was to describe how adolescent risk 
assessment tools are used in legal proceedings and not to offer direction or advice about how 
these tools should be used, some strengths and possible areas of improvement can be identified 
from our results.  In particular, this review revealed that protective factors are sometimes being 
considered by judges as an important aspect of the risk assessment.  This is significant because it 
is consistent with research that has shown protective factors may play an important role in 
mitigating the effects of risk factors in high risk adolescent offenders (Lodewijks et al., 2010; 
Rennie & Dolan, 2010). 
 However, while the consideration of some protective factors can be seen as a relative 
strength of current court practices, our results also indicate that there is considerable room for 
improvement.  First, although some attention is currently being paid to protective factors, this is 
an area where even more attention may be merited. For instance, because the presence of 
protective factors amongst youth have shown to predict desistance from reoffending (Lodewijks 
et al., 2010; Rennie & Dolan, 2010) they should be considered an increasingly important aspect 
of risk management and treatment planning within the youth criminal justice system.  
 Second, another means through which the use of these tools in adolescent legal 
proceedings could be improved is by increasing emphasis on the dynamic nature of many of the 
risk factors identified by these tools.  As previously demonstrated, very few judges explicitly 
noted in their decisions that the specific risk factors of the youth were highly amenable to 
change.  This could be particularly relevant for the issue of sentencing and adult transfer because 
while judges are sometimes using this information to inform their decisions, they are rarely 
recognizing that the appropriateness of the conditions imposed upon the youth may change as the 
risk and protective factors specific to the youth change.  This is consistent with the general 
observation that in terms of development, adolescents are “moving targets” (Borum, 2000; 
Melton et al., 2007).  To ensure that greater attention is placed on the dynamic nature of risk, 
clinicians who conduct risk assessments for the courts should further emphasize the malleability 
of these traits and the tendency for youth to change as they progress through their psychosocial 
and emotional development (Borum, 2000).  In addition, from a policy perspective, this suggests 
the need for the courts to frequently review the conditions that they impose on young offenders.  
 Finally, given the challenges that were raised regarding the use of risk assessment in 
adolescent sentencing, this suggests a need for further discussion and education by both courts 
and clinicians about the role that risk assessments should and should not play in sentencing.  This 
concern is also reiterated in a survey of Canadian judges conducted by Bonta, Bourgon, Jessman 
and Tessine (2005), which revealed that 68.3% of judges agreed that risk assessments should be 
included in pre-sentence reports. However, 21.2% were overtly opposed to including this 
information.  Although many judges cited concerns about the validity and reliability of risk 
assessment tools as the reason for their opposition (Bonta et al., 2005), this further indicates the 
need for ongoing discussion between mental health professionals and the courts about the role 
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and purpose of risk assessment.  For example, there appears to be a growing consensus amongst 
legal professionals that the main purpose of risk assessment should be to reduce future violence 
through implementing effective risk management and preventative strategies (Luther & 
Mansfield, 2006) as opposed to informing sentencing and disposition decisions, which has the 
potential to disrupt proportionality and contribute to ‘statistical justice’ (Maurutto & Hannah-
Moffat, 2007).  
 The results of this case law review also provide some possible directions for future areas 
of research. First of all, future law reviews could explore the sentencing outcomes associated 
with the SAVRY and YLS/CMI.  For example, it would be interesting to compare the 
dispositions of youth who have comparable index offenses but different identified risk levels. 
Although research has shown that there is a significant relationship between unstructured clinical 
assessments of risk and sentencing outcomes (Lodewijks et al., 2008), this relationship has not 
been established using risk assessment tools.  Another prospective area of research could be to 
survey judges regarding how often and in what contexts they most often encounter these risk 
assessment tools, their satisfaction with risk assessments, and how likely they are to include this 
information in their decision making process.  Given that many cases do not include written 
decisions, this could provide information which a case law review cannot.  Furthermore, as many 
risk assessments are provided for the courts, there is a strong need for a better understanding of 
the perspectives of legal consumers of risk assessments (Heilbrun et al., 2011; Otto & Heilbrun, 
2002).  
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Figure 1. Number of cases using the specified adolescent risk assessment tools. Note 
that there were no published instances prior to 2003. 
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Table 1 
 
Interrater Reliability  
Variable % agreement  coefficient 
Type of Legal Proceeding 90% - 
Current Charge(s) 100% 1.00 
Evaluator Background 90% .87 
Judge referred to risk assessment in making legal 
decision 100% 1.00 
How much weight the Judge placed on the risk 
assessment  90% .80 
Challenges or disputes arose regarding the risk 
assessment as evidence 100% 1.00 
Who challenged or disputed the risk assessment 100% 1.00 
   Note: n = 10. It was not possible to calculate kappa for Type of Legal Proceeding because all 
of these cases were sentencing evaluations, and thus there was not adequate range. 
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Table 2 
 
Types of Court Cases in which Adolescent Risk Assessments were Included  
Type Percentage (n = 51) 
Sentencing/Disposition 66.7% (n = 34) 
U.S. Adult Certification/Transfer to Criminal Court  13.7% (n = 7) 
Canada Adult Sentencing  11.8% (n = 6) 
Application for Extended/Continued Custody  3.9% (n = 2) 
Dangerous Offender Assessment  2.0% (n = 1) 
Other (ie. evidence admissibility)  2.0% (n = 1) 
   Note: One case, R v. Bird, included two applications, and hence is counted twice.  
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Table 3 
 
Types of Offenses in which Adolescent Risk Assessments were Conducted 
Type Percentage (n = 79) 
Murder 17.7% (n = 14) 
     Murder 10.1% (n = 8) 
     Attempted Murder 1.3% (n = 1) 
     Manslaughter  6.3% (n = 5) 
Sexual Assault 7.6% (n = 6) 
Assault   12.6% (n = 10) 
Kidnapping/Abduction/Unlawful Confinement  6.3% (n = 5) 
Robbery/Theft 20.3% (n = 16) 
Break and Enter  8.9% (n = 7) 
Possession of Weapon for Dangerous Purpose  
Unlawful Possession 
Uttering Threats 
Criminal Negligence Causing Bodily Harm 
Arson 
Criminal Mischief 
7.6% (n = 6) 
2.5% (n = 2) 
2.5% (n = 2) 
1.3% (n = 1) 
1.3% (n = 1) 
1.3% (n = 1) 
Note: Many cases contained more than one charge; this excludes probation and bail breaches.  
.  
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Table 4 
 
Professional Designations of Evaluator who Conducted the Risk Assessment   
Type Percentage (n = 51) 
Psychologist  33.3% (n = 17) 
Psychiatrist   15.7% (n = 8) 
Youth Worker  9.8% (n = 5) 
Probation Officer   5.9% (n = 3) 
Other 2.0% (n = 1) 
Unknown   33.3% (n =17) 
Note: One case, R v. D. (M.D.), included two evaluations by different evaluators and therefore,  
is counted twice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
THE SAVRY AND YLS/CMI IN ADOLESCENT COURT PROCEEDINGS   28 
 
Table 5 
 
Statements Made About the Risk Assessment Tool  
Type 
SAVRY 
 (n = 27) 
YLS/CMI or LSI-
SK 
(n = 31) 
Overall 
(n = 58) 
Refers to youth’s specific risk 
factors 40.7% (n = 11) 32.3% (n = 10) 
36.2% (n = 
21) 
Refers to youth’s protective factors 
or strengths 29.6% (n = 8) 9.7% (n = 3) 19.0% (n =11) 
Note: Some cases used both the YLS/CMI and SAVRY; in interpreting these results, it is 
important to remember that published cases do not contain all of the case relevant information. 
Therefore, it is possible that the details of the assessment were discussed but not published. 
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Table 6 
 
Weight Placed on Risk Assessments in Judicial Decision Making  
Type Percentage (n = 50) 
Referenced Risk Assessment in Decision  
     Judge did not refer to risk assessment in making legal decisions 24.0% (n = 12) 
     Judge indirectly referred to risk assessment (e.g., risk assessment 
      not directly mentioned, but refers to risk, needs, or management). 
30.0% (n = 15) 
     Judge directly referred to risk assessment in making legal      
     decisions 
46.0% (n = 23) 
Weight Placed on Risk Assessment in Decision  
     Judge placed no clear weight or disregarded these statements 38.0% (n = 19) 
     Judge placed some weight (e.g., one of many factors considered) 58.0% (n = 29) 
     Judge put great weight on the risk assessment (e.g., singled it out 
     as an important factor) 
4.0% (n = 2) 
Risk Assessment was Challenged or Disputed  
     Inclusion of risk assessment statements were challenged or 
     disputed  
22.0% (n = 11) 
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